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Abstract
With the numerous monetary policy reforms undertaken during the 1990s, inflation targeting
emerged as one of the possible solutions. The macroeconomic performance of this regime has
attracted the attention of recent research, yet no final consensus on its role is reached. The aim
of this paper is to contribute to this debate through a panoply of mixed results proven by the
recent literature. Empirically,  the purpose of this study is to assess the impact of inflation
targeting  on inflation and output based on a panel of 30 OECD countries over the period
1980_2012, using the “differences-in- differences” approach of Ball and Sheridan (2005). Our
results  indicate  that  inflation  targeting  helps  to  improve  macroeconomic  performance  of
targeters OECD countries more than non- targeters in terms of average inflation and volatility.
Our findings corroborate previous studies like those of Wu (2004), Ball and Sheridan (2005)
and Manai,O (2014). However, our results point to an insignificant impact of this regime on
output  consistent  with Gonçalves-  Salles (2008) and Ftiti  & Essadi  (2013). However,  our
results contrast those of S-Hebbel (2007) and Ftiti J. Goux (2011) which assume that there is
no difference between targeters and non-targeters OECD countries.
Keywords: Inflation targeting, Performance, Macroeconomic Dimensions, Monetary Policy, Panel Analysis. 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, G21
1. INTRODUCTION
The task of implementing price stability mechanisms by central banks began during the eighties as a
framework of monetary policy reform. Indeed, the concern with price stability remains the primary
objective of any central bank via a direct anchorage of a healthy and robust target, namely inflation, to
reduce  inflationary  pressures.  Therefore,  inflation  targeting,  emerged  in  the  early  1990s  in  New
Zealand to spread later to both developed and emerging economies. The global spread of monetary
policy initiatives gave birth to the debate on the macroeconomic performance of this new strategy,
which has even attracted attention of recent research, yet no final consensus on the role of inflation
targeting has been reached so far. 
An overview of the literature points to mixed results, which assume in the first place that inflation
targeting  contributes  to  an  improved  macroeconomic  performance  of  inflation  targeting-adopting
countries than non-adopters.  The effect  is  observable in terms of stability of average inflation,  its
volatility (Wu (2004)), and its anticipation (Lin Ye (2010)). However, other studies like that of Ftiti &
Essaadi (2013) assumed that this new monetary policy does not stabilize inflation behavior.
Moreover,  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  inflation  targeting  were  evaluated  in  terms  of  output
behavior. Some studies show that this new monetary policy does not affect neither average level nor
volatility of  output  (Ball  and Sheridan (2005)).  This  result  seems to contradict  that  of  Conçalves
carvalho (2009) which assumed that stability of the average level and volatility of output is observed
for inflation targeters countries than non-targeters.
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Bearing on these mixed results that are proven by recent research, this paper aims at assessing the
macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting on a panel of OECD countries. Specifically, we study the
relationship between inflation targeting,  inflation and output,  factors that  are known to reflect  the
macroeconomic performance of these countries. In other words, this study allows us to see whether
inflation  targeting  is  different  between  targeters  and  non-targeters  OECD  countries  in  terms  of
improved macroeconomic performance.  To this end,  we opt  for a comparative empirical  analysis,
using a panel data approach based on the model of Ball and Sheridan (2005).
This paper is structured as follows: the second section presents an overview of the literature. The third
section presents the econometric methodology and the main results. Finally, a fourth section discusses
the main findings.
2. THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The spread of inflation targeting in developed countries during the nineties has touched as well many
emerging countries. These latter engaged effectively in the practice of price stability or in the debate
on its macroeconomic performance on which the recent literature focused in order to understand its
impact on macroeconomic dimensions without nevertheless reaching consistent results.
According  to  the  literature  review,  several  studies  confirm  that  such  a  system  improves
macroeconomic performance of countries that have adopted the new framework compared to those
that have not. However, this assumption does not apply to other studies whose results showed that
inflation targeting does not improve specific macroeconomic indicators, mainly inflation and output.
Inflation targeting as measured by changes in inflation levels remains the focus of many economists
like Ball & Sheridan (2005), Lin & Ye (2007) & Angeriz Arestis (2008). These authors found that
inflation  targeting  has  an  insignificant  impact  on  average  inflation  and  its  volatility  in  OECD
countries, unlike Batini & Laxton (2007) who studied a sample of emerging countries and found a
significant effect of inflation targeting on average inflation as well as on its variability.
Wu (2004) studied a sample of 22 OECD countries divided into two groups of adopters and non-
adopters  of  an  inflation-targeting  regime  during  the  1985-2002  period  using  the  "difference  in
difference estimation method". The results of this empirical methodology confirm that only countries
integrating  this  new  monetary  policy  came  to  significantly  reduce  their  average  inflation  rate.
Likewise,  Gonçalves  & Salles  (2008)  examined  a  sample  consisting of  36 emerging  countries  of
which  only 13  countries  have  adopted  inflation  targeting  while  the  remaining  23  countries  have
adopted alternative monetary regimes, during the period 1980- 2005. The results show that emerging
countries  with inflation targeting regimes  registered reduced average inflation than those with no
inflation targeting regimes.
The findings of the study of Ftiti & Essadi (2013) were inconsistent with those of earlier studies on
industrialized countries. Specifically, these authors studied the performance of the inflation-targeting
regimes in New Zealand and Canada during 1990s and found that these regimes could not control nor
stabilize inflation in these countries. Almeida & Goodhart (1998) and Bernanke et al. (1999) found
that inflation forecast errors were reduced gradually over time for the countries that have adopted an
inflation-targeting regime. Lin Ye (2010) using a VAR model shows that inflation forecast errors have
decreased with the progressive adoption of inflation targeting. They also showed that persistence of
inflation has declined sharply for targeters countries during the 1990s.
Moreover, Friedman & Kuttner (1996), Friedman (2002) and Ehrmann & Ceccheti (2002), Shmidt
Hebbel (2007) Ftiti (2010) studied average output growth and its volatility for OECD countries as well
as for emerging countries. The authors conducted a comparative analysis of a panel of OECD inflation
targeters and non-targeters from the year 1998. The same comparative analysis is conducted on a panel
2
of  emerging  inflation  targeters  and  non-targeters  countries  from  2001.  The  results  indicate  that
inflation targeting does not negatively affect output growth and its volatility. In other words, inflation
targeting is not affected by a high level of output under lower inflation.
Furthermore, Ball & Sheridan (2005) studying a sample of 20 OECD countries, found that inflation
targeting has no effect on average output growth as well as its variability, suggesting that this regime
does not in any way explain any changes in output in the real economy. Goncalves & Carvalho (2009),
examining  a  sample  of  30 OECD countries,  found that  countries  adopting  an inflation targeting
regime suffer  an output  loss much higher than that registered by non-targeters countries. In other
words,  targeters  OECD  countries  earn  7%  of  output  loss  compared  to  countries  adopting  other
monetary regimes which lose more production as inflation decreases.
Batini & Laxton (2007) and Goncalves & Salles (2008), who studied a sample of emerging countries,
found  that  inflation  targeting  reduces  output  volatility  in  emerging  economies  in  favor  of  lower
inflation,  while  a  negligible  impact  on  the  average  output  growth  in  this  group  of  countries  is
observed.  Line  &  Ye  (2010)  found  that  output  volatility  is  reduced  for  both  emerging  and
industrialized countries. Vega & Winkelried (2005), Batini Laxton (2006), Goncalves & Salles (2008)
Armando FA Roger (2013) assume that inflation targeters countries still have average low volatility of
inflation  in  addition  to  a  high  output  growth  than  non-targeters  countries,  allowing  therefore  for
economic stability.
Carlos Eduardo Gonçalves S, Joao M rooms. (2008) and Lin Ye (2010) studied interest rates behavior
explained by inflation targeting in a sample of 36 emerging economies over the period 1980 -2005.
The Panel data analysis concluded that inflation targeting stabilized average short-term interest rates
for targeters than non-targeters countries, which corroborates the results of Ball and Sheridan (2005).
The results point also to a reduced level of volatility for both groups of countries, but it remains lower
for targeters countries than those adopting alternative monetary regimes.
3. ECONOMETRICS AND MAJOR FINDINGS 
3.1. DATA AND MODEL
Our  study  aims  at  evaluating  the  macroeconomic  performance  of  inflation  targeting  in  terms  of
inflation behavior,  output  as well  as their  volatilities.  Indeed,  our study examines a sample of 30
OECD  industrialized  countries  during  the  period  1980-2012,  using  an  annually  frequency  data
extracted from the World Bank’s CD statistics (World Development Indicators ).
The 30 OECD countries in our sample are 15 adopting inflation targeting, labelled inflation targeters,
or  the  treatment  group (Australia,  Canada,  Chile,  Korea  Republic,  Finland,  Israel,  Norway,  New
Zealand, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Poland, United Kingdoms, Sweden, Switzerland), and 15
countries  that  have  adopted  alternative  monetary  regimes,  labelled  inflation  non-targeters,  or  the
control  group  (Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Estonia,  USA,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia).
The study of the impact of inflation targeting regime on macroeconomic performance measured by the
behavior of inflation and output growth uses the dual "the differences in differences" approach1 of Ball
and Sheridan (2005).
Xpost – Xpré=α0 + α1D + α2Xipré + ε
1 A standard approach of Ball and Sheridan 2005 which allows to avoid selection bias and to determine the
impact of inflation targeting on a variable X by comparing a treatment group with a control group.
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where
Xpost: value of X during the post-targeting phase.
ΔX =Xpost- Xpre
Xpre: value of X during the pre-targeting phase..
α0: a Constant
=1 if the country adopts inflation targeting.
D : Dummy Variable  
  =0 otherwise.
α1: the coefficient of the dummy variable to measure the real impact  of inflation targeting on the
variable X.
Xpre: the initial value of each variable.
α2: coefficient of the initial value that indicates the impact of the latter on macroeconomic indicators.
ε: error term
Xi: Takes the values of the following variables
Average inflation (measured by the Index Consumption Price)
Inflation volatility (measured by standard deviation)
Average output growth (measured by GDP growth rate)
Output growth volatility (measured by standard deviation)
Our study examines two sampling periods in order to assess robustness and to compare the actual
effect of inflation targeting on macroeconomic variables between the period prior to targeting and the
one that follows it. To compare the two groups of targeters and non-targeters countries, it is necessary
to assess macroeconomic improvement generated by the monetary system. Then, we develop a first
period called the pre-targeting period that begins in 1980 and finishes before the post-targeting date,
respecting the date of adoption of inflation targeting by each country. The post-targeting period begins
at the date of adoption of inflation targeting by each country until the end of 2012.
In fact, dividing in such a way our sampling periods is not adequate for non-targeters countries where
Ball  and Sheridan (2005)  propose that  the  end date  of  the  period of  pre-targeting is  the  average
inflation targeting adoption date. Then, the adoption date for non-targeters countries is the average
date of the adoption dates of targeting countries which corresponds to the year 1995, as shown in
Table 3.12.
2 (1994+1991+1999+1998+1995+1993+1990+2005+1997+1998+1992+1994+1993)/15
4
Table 3.1 : Adoption date and sampling periods 
Country Adoption date Pre-targeting period Post-targeting period
Targeters countries
Australia 1994 1980-1993 1994-2012
Canada 1991 1980-1990 1991-2012
Chile 1999 1980-1998 1999-2012
Republic of Korea 1998 1980-1997 1998-2012
Spain 1995 1980-1994 1995-2012
Finland 1993 1980-1992 1993-2012
Israel 1997 1980-1996 1997-2012
Norway 1993 1980-1992 1993-2012
New Zealand 1990 1980-1989 1990-2012
Slovakia 2005 1980-2004 2005-2012
Tchec Republic 1997 1980-1996 1997-2012
Poland 1998 1980-1997 1998-2012
United Kingdom 1992 1980-1991 1992-2012
Sweden 1994 1980-1993 1994-2012
Switzerland 1993 1980-1992 1993-2012
3.2. The MAIN RESULTS
3.2.1 Effect on inflation behavior 
     In what follows, we will study the real impact of inflation targeting on average inflation rate for
each group of targeters and non-targeters countries. The results in Table 3.2 indicate that the dummy
variable for targeters country is negative and statistically significant where P-value = 0.000, less than
10% indicating that inflation targeting adversely affects inflation by 4.575%, less than non-targeters,
whose inflation rate fell by only 3.92%.
The  coefficient  of  the  initial  inflation  value (Xpre)  which represents  the  impact  of  this  latter  on
average inflation is positively and statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, when the initial
inflation value of targeters countries increases by 1%, this positively affects average inflation rate by
14.3%. However this value is less important for non-targeters, whose initial inflation value increases
inflation level by 35%.
Adoption of  inflation  targeting  affects  negatively and statistically  on  explaining  average  inflation
behavior  of  OECD  targeters  countries,  suggesting  that  they  are  better  able  to  improve  their
macroeconomic performance in terms of inflation than most countries that have adopted alternative
inflation plans. Regression of our model can tell us about the real impact of inflation targeting on
inflation volatility, as indicated by the dummy variable
Table 3.2: Estimation of annual average inflation 
Dependent Variable: Inflation
                                     Targeters countries                            Non-targeters countries
Constant                        4.694*(4.83)                                              1.564*** (1.88)
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Dummy Variable          -4.575*(-15.63)                                         -3.924*(-11.09)
Initial value (Xpr)           0.143** (2.06)                                            0.350*(6.09)
R2                                                       0.456                                                           0.399
Notes: *, **, *** denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
.
In Table 3.3 the dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level and the P
value = 0.00 <10%. This implies that inflation targeting for targeters countries can reduce inflation
volatility by 0.487% more than that of non-targeters whose inflation rate declined by only 0.318%
following the adoption of alternative monetary regimes.
The  coefficient  of  the  initial  value  (0.101)  for  targeters  countries  is  positively  and  statistically
significant at the 5% level with a P-value = 0.031 <10%. This result indicates that any increase in the
initial  inflation  volatility  by  1% for  targeters  countries  leads  to  an  increase  in  average  inflation
volatility  by  0.101%.  However,  the  effect  of  the  initial  value  for  non-targeters  is  positive  and
statistically non-significant with a P-value = 0.262> 10 %, indicating that the initial value does not
explain average inflation volatility of for this group of countries.
Adoption  of  inflation  targeting  negatively and  statistically  explains  inflation  volatility  for  OECD
targeters  countries,  reflecting a reduction and a stability of inflation volatility for these countries,
which remain more performing than those adopting alternative inflation regimes.
Table 3.3: Estimation of inflation rate volatility 
Dependent Variable: Inflation volatility 
                                   Targeters countries                                               Non-targeters countries 
Constant                          1.124*(8.75)                                                      0.852*(5.72)
Dummy Variable            -0.487*(-3.67)                                                   -0.318*(-3.70)
Initial value (Xpre)          0.101** (2.17)                                                    0.109***(1.12)
R2                                                           0.064                                                                                                     0.043
Notes: *, **, *** denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
3.1.2 Effect on output
The real effect of inflation targeting on output growth is assessed by the regression of the econometric
model to estimate the dummy variable that reflects the true effect of the adopted regime on average
output and its volatility.
Table 3.4 below shows the overall results on the real effect of inflation targeting on average output.
For targeters countries, the coefficient of the dummy variable = -0223 is negative and statistically
significant (p value = 0.412> 10%), which shows that inflation targeting does not explain the increase
in average output growth.
The coefficient of the initial value Xpre = 0.408 is positive and statistically significant (P value = 0.00
<10%) at the 1% level. This finding helps explain the increase in average output of targeters countries
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despite the non-significance of the dummy variable. In other words, increasing the level of initial
output positively effects level of average output growth by increasing it by 0.408, more than that of
non-targeters whose initial value does increase average output by only 0.053. The regression results
indicate that the increase in average output growth can be explained only by other different exogenous
variables other than inflation targeting.
Table 3.4 : Estimation of average GDP growth 
Dependent Variable: average output
                                     Targeters countries                                    Non-targeters countries
Constant                        2.155*(7.26)                                             2.444*(9.28)         
Dummy Variable          -0.223*** (-0.82)                                       -0.818*(-3.53)
Initial Value (Xpré)        0.408(5.61)*                                                   0.053*** (0.37)
R2                                                     0.113                                                          0.03
Notes: *, **, *** denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
In what follows, we examine the real effect of inflation targeting on output volatility. According to the
results shown in Table 3.5 below, the coefficient of the dummy variable for targeters countries is
negative  (-0250)  and  not  statistically  significant  (P  value  =  0.132>  10%).  This  indicates  that
introducing inflation targeting does not explain output growth volatility in these targeters countries,
because of the insignificant  impact  of  the exogenous variable on the endogenous variable (output
volatility).
Coefficient of the initial value (Xpre) is statistically significant (P value = 0.000 <10%) at the 1%
level.  This  means  that  any increase in  the initial  value of  output  volatility for  targeters countries
positively effects average output volatility, increasing it by 0.222, in contrast to non-targeters whose
initial  value of  output  volatility  does  not  affect  this  latter,  because of  the  non-significance of  its
coefficient (P value = 0.277 <10%).
From these results, we may conclude that introducing inflation targeting generates an insignificant
impact on the performance of OECD targeters countries, in terms of the stability of average output
volatility, which remains determined by other exogenous variables other than inflation targeting.
Table 3.5: Estimation of output growth volatility 
Dependent Variable: average output growth 
                                Targeters countries                                               Non-targeters countries
Constant                 1.151*(6.48)                                                     1.208*** (5.79)  
Dummy Variable   -0.250*** (-1.51)                                               0.125*** (1.09)
Initial value            0.222*(3.64)                                                    -0.022*(-0.18)
R2                              0.044                                                               0.003
Notes: *, **, *** denote respectively significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
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4. CONCLUSION
The discussion of the macroeconomic performance of inflation targeting remains controversial as our
results  confirm previous  studies  and  refute  others.  Specifically,  our  results  indicate  that  inflation
targeting actually improves macroeconomic performance of OECD targeters countries in stabilizing
average inflation and its volatility, as inflation targeting is found to have a negative and statistically
significant impact on inflation, as reflected by the significance of the dummy variable.
This trend is  different  for output  behavior of targeters countries,  where inflation targeting has no
impact on either average output growth or its volatility, given the non-significance of the exogenous
variable (Dummy),  suggesting that  output  behavior of targeters countries is  explained by external
determinants other than inflation targeting.
In  our  study,  we  conclude  that  inflation  targeting  for  OECD  targeters  countries  improve  their
macroeconomic  performance  only  in  stabilizing  average  inflation  and  its  volatility  than  for  non-
targeters countries, which score low performance. Accordingly,  an improvement in output remains
unaffected by this regime, which is consistent with Wu (2004), Ball  and Sheridan (2005), Lin Ye
(2010),  Ftiti  Z  (2013),  and  Manai,  O  (2014)  who  assume  that  there  is  a  difference  between
performance of targeters and non-targeters countries, ultimately favoring targeters countries. However,
our study seems to contradict those of Neumann Von Hagen (2002), Truman (2003), Mishkin Shmidt
Hebbel (2007), Brito & Bystedt (2010) who found no difference between performance of targeters and
non-targeters OECD countries.
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